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worthe upon him, a late use of the verb *worthe*; *hire ought to be right glad*, compared with *him must be vp be tyme*; *desired to have a doo with*, *durst to have to doo with*, on the same page; *him was leuer iust with him*, cf. supra; *a goode stede that he come riding on*; *a knight that come prikking toward him*; *the which was liker a fende than*; *myn handes*; *thou fond . . . felt thou*; *a more sole than he*; *in his sole wyse*; *hire must goo elles where*; *ouergate* = *overtook*; *a richman, thogh he be noght worth an haw, he shal be worshipped for his riches*; *they harboured them in an village, where theim must all thre ly in oon hous*; *she had levere haue had him than all the world*, cf. supra; *hire must nedes be deid*; *thou art fals & fightes*; *I am the giaunt & haue won the ladie, I hight Leonyn & has here won the ladie of this land*.

But these examples must suffice as illustrations of modern English in the making. The whole cast of phrase and turn of expression seem to me post-Chaucerian, to say nothing of the more modern forms of spelling. The mingling of Northern forms with a dialect which is in its general features East Midland would simply point to the northern border of the East Midland district as the locality of composition. This does not exclude the supposition that an East Midland scribe may have worked over an earlier West Midland version of the romance, and neglected to change certain forms; he may even have inserted such a form as *saith*, met with in the formulas *the wise man saith*, *the boke saith*, for the more common *sais*. However it may be, the chief value of C lies in supplying us with a *prose* version of *later* composition than A or B, and thus helping us to trace the formation of English prose. Had Mr. King-ton-Oliphant known of this version, it might have been of service in working up his "New English." He refers to Weber's text of B (I 188). It remains for some scholar to give us a complete analysis of the grammar and vocabulary of this version, now that Kölbling has so well supplied the text.

JAMES M. GARNETT.

Geschichte der alten Philosophie von Dr. W. WINDELBAND. Separat-abdruck aus dem Handbuch der klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft. Nördlingen, Verlag der C. H. Beck'schen Buchhandlung, 1888.

Readers of Windelband's History of Modern Philosophy will be somewhat disappointed in this volume. The book is a well composed, lucidly arranged repetitorium of the external facts of Greek philosophy, which will doubtless be very serviceable to young German candidates who have no time to read their Zeller. But to those who read for insight it offers nothing comparable to the masterly account of the intellectual history of Kant in the author's Modern Philosophy, or to the chapters on Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, in the generally ignored or disparaged work of Mr. Alfred Benn. And the reason is plain. The author does not appear to possess the intimate first-hand familiarity with the text of the Greek philosophers which we have a right to expect in one who claims a hearing on this well-worn theme. This deficiency is least felt in the earlier chapters, where the literature to be mastered comprises only a few fragments, and in the summary survey of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy with which the book concludes. I doubt whether the study of the pre-Socratic philosophies admits of any satisfactory compromise between the exhaustive

erudition of Zeller and the picturesque sampling of Mayor. But our author's philosophic acumen makes his arrangement and reflections suggestive and worthy of the student's attention. He knows more about the necessary relations of the brilliant *aperçus* that have come down to us from these early thinkers, and more about the 'wissenschaftliche genossenschaften' of early Hellas than a sceptical critic of our authorities would admit. But this is perhaps in part owing to the desire, natural in a professor, of recognizing with due courtesy the 'scharfsinnige combinationen' of friends and colleagues. Among the chief features of his arrangement may be mentioned: 1. The discrimination of Heraclitus from the Ionian philosophers of nature, and the emphasizing of the fundamental philosophic antithesis between Heraclitus and the Eleatics. 2. The grouping of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and the Pythagoreans as mediators between these two opposite poles of thought. The claim of Anaxagoras for special recognition on account of his overvalued doctrine of *voûc* is denied, and the Pythagoreans are forced into line as 'vermittler,' apparently because there was no other convenient place for them. 3. While Leucippus is relegated to the 'vermittler,' the philosophy of Democritus is distinguished from that of his *éraipos* as a post-sophistic development of Protagorean relativism, and as the first and greatest system of consistent materialism is declared to possess 'historische ebenbürtigkeit neben dem Platonismus' (p. 90). There is doubtless a measure of truth in this. Platonism and materialism constitute the fundamental antithesis in the history of philosophy. The exaggerations of Bacon and Lange were perhaps needed to rescue the great name of Democritus from unmerited obscurity. But we know too little of Democritus to take him as the representative of a consistent philosophic materialism. The seventeenth century materialists may have derived their cosmogony from him through Gassendi and Lucretius. But the psychological half of their doctrine—the psychology of Hobbes—is taken directly from Aristotle. We have no sure criterion for distinguishing Democritus from Leucippus, on the one hand, and from Epicurus, as reported by Lucretius, on the other. It is possible that the gravitation of the atoms is a blunder of unknown Epicureans not attributable to Democritus (p. 189), but as we have only secondary authorities divided among themselves, it is idle to affirm it dogmatically. In general it may be said that Aristotle's accounts of the rationale of previous philosophies are infected with his own terminology to an extent that almost destroys their value as evidence. And our author's evident reliance on the neat and convenient outline of early Greek philosophy given in Met. I 6 is a weakness.

Again, there is no reason for making the philosophy of Democritus an outgrowth of the Protagorean relativism except the exigences of the parallel with Plato. There is nothing in the atomistic theory that is not sufficiently accounted for in Windelband's own acute sentence (p. 52): "Wer der Willkürlichkeit der Vierzahl der Elemente bei Empedokles entgehen wollte, musste, um dieser Lehre eine konsequente Theorie entgegenzustellen, von den qualitativen Bestimmtheiten der Dinge entweder behaupten dass sie sämmtlich ursprünglich seien, oder dass es keine von ihnen sei." Democritus accepted the second alternative and Plato both. He was led to do so by the same necessities of thought that force modern scientific thinkers, after affirming in their analysis that the atoms and their motions alone exist *éreñ*, to turn sud-

denly round and admit, with Mill, that the ultimate laws of nature cannot be fewer than the perceptible differences in our sensations and thoughts. It is by no means certain that the "author of the Parmenides and Sophistes" makes no reference to atomism. The *ōykol* of the Parmenides and the material substance of Sophistes 246c, which the dialecticians shiver into elusive fragments, may well be interpreted as an allusion to atomism. The theory of the elements in the Timaeus is essentially atomistic—a reduction of quality to quantity. The Pythagoreanism of the dialogue is purely literary and ethical surplusage. But Plato saw that the elimination of qualities, though scientifically convenient to the physicist, is, as Windelband himself says, a philosophic impossibility. Hence, what our author calls the 'zweiweltentheorie,' the superposition of that other parallel immaterial world which Democritus refused to see, but which profounder thinkers are always forced to recognize in one form or another.

The chapter devoted to Plato is the least satisfactory in the book. German science has long since excerpted and indexed the most striking passages of the dialogues. German philosophy has invented concise formulae to express the philosophic import of each of the greater dialogues. Nothing is easier than by skilful combination of these ready-made materials to hit upon new and original views with regard to the genuineness and order of composition of the works in the Platonic canon, and the growth and significance of the Platonic philosophy. It is easy to say that Plato could not have composed both the *Politicus* and the *Republic* because he would not have written twice upon the same theme; that the Sophistes cannot be by Plato because in the *Phaedo* (this is Windelband's strange interpretation of *Phaedo* 100D) Plato declares that he insists more on the fact of the existence of ideas than on the problem of their relations to things, which is the problem of the Sophistes; that the *Parmenides* cannot be Platonic because the *Philebus* dismisses in cavalier fashion the main problem of the *Parmenides* (Windelband is apparently unacquainted with the arguments of Dr. Jackson), and Plato was bound like Aristotle to reopen any question whenever he met it. But no one who has really studied these dialogues will ever say these things, or for one moment balance such infinitesimal plausibilities against the immense improbability that the Greece of Plato's time contained an unknown genius capable of producing such masterpieces, and that the products of two distinct minds could reveal the countless subtle affinities of thought and feeling which the faithful student detects linking these dialogues to the Platonic corpus as a whole.

Much the same may be said of our author's affirmation with regard to the order of composition of the dialogues. There are two views of the Platonic compositions, says Professor Windelband: 1. That they were composed in execution of a predetermined plan. 2. That they represent the 'entwicklungsphase' of Plato's mind at the time when they were severally written. There is a third view—perhaps the true one—that the actual composition of the dialogues was determined by factors of literary impulse and opportunity not now ascertainable in detail, and that they present, not a pedantically predetermined system, but different aspects of a thought that had in the main reached its maturity before it was offered to the public. Professor Windelband assigns the *Phaedo* to the later period of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* for pre-

cisely the reasons that lead Dr. Jackson to regard it as an early phase of Platonism. These philosophic necessities may be left to devour one another. But when our author asserts that Plato was very late in becoming acquainted with the philosophy of Anaxagoras as expounded in the Phaedo, one wonders what conception he forms of the intellectual development of a youth like Plato in the Athens of the Peloponnesian war.

It is somewhat surprising, after Thompson's edition of the Phaedrus, to find that there are scholars who still cling to the old fancy that the dialogue was a 'schulprogramm.' Were this the place, I might show that in addition to the rich and elaborate diction noted by Professor Campbell, the dialogue shows a remarkable affinity in thought with the Laws. Professor Windelband's preface vindicates the originality of his view of the Republic, which has been presented for years from the professorial chair. His students, it would appear, are taught that the Republic is wanting "in artistic and philosophic unity." The deeper psychological justification of the banishment of the poets, which obviously could not be introduced before the analysis of pleasure and the conception of a city in which pleasure and pain were not to be lords, is pronounced a disturbing digression. The admirable dramatic prelude in which Plato resumes the methods of the tentative ethical dialogues before advancing to a deeper study of the problem, is treated as a separate dialogue on justice. The remainder of the work is divided into two sections, a later insertion (487-587) on the idea of the good and the various degenerate forms of government, and a "hauptstock" (367-486 and 588 to end) contemporaneous with Phaedrus and Symposium, which develops the theory of the ideal state as the embodiment of justice. It is idle to argue against such arbitrary assertions. Nobody can prove that the composition of the Republic was absolutely uninterrupted, or that portions of the manuscript were not read at Athens before the whole was given to the public. If we should say that the words (588 B) ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδίκειν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν, obviously refer to the comparison of the three types of life, and the portrayal of the true inner state of the tyrant soul and city, Professor Windelband would probably be ready to assert that the πολλὰ λοιπὰ which 484 A declares necessary to the explanation of τὶ διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκον, are sufficiently set out in 484-7. And if we called his attention to the words ἐγὼ μὲν γὰ τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν ὡς μοι ἔφαί νοντο ἔκασται εἰς ἄλλήλων μεταβαίνειν of 449 A B, in which Socrates announces that discussion of the forms of government which is supposed by the theory to be a late result of Plato's Sicilian experience (p. 110 n.), the answer would doubtless be that the paragraph was written by "der alternde Plato" to effect a transition. Truly τό γε ἀμφισβητήσαι οἱ χαλεπόν.

As for the interpretation of the Platonic philosophy as a whole, I have elsewhere said that it is in the main an effort to rescue the Greek mind from the confusions of logical scepticism and the pernicious consequences of the disintegration of the moral and religious sense in the Greeks of the Peloponnesian war. There is a partial and formal recognition of this in Windelband's characterization of Platonism as 'ethischer immaterialismus,' but he does not bring us face to face with the real human conditions involved, and he habitually treats what are at least in large measure logical problems as metaphysical.

It was Hegel rather than Plato who undertook "aus dem aufgestelltem

Begriffe alle Consequenzen zu ziehen." Plato developed the consequences of a λόγος or proposition (*Phaedo*), or in illustration of the ambiguity of the copula of the *elvai* or μὴ *elvai* of a concept (*Parmenides*).

Plato does not call the idea the cause of the 'erscheinungswelt' in the *Phaedo* (p. 116), nor does he there identify the ideas with 'zwecke.' He distinctly says that, unable to find a satisfactory statement of physical or teleological causation, he falls back upon the ideas as a safe surrogate of either or both. This error, however, will be repeated by every student of the *Phaedo* who does not take the pains to distinguish the *causa sciendi* from the *causa fiendi* and the *causa agendi*, and then proceed to inquire what bearing the statements of Plato have upon the distinction. To a similar confounding of logic and metaphysics is due the acceptance of Zeller's identification of the μὴ ὅν and the ἀπειρον with matter. The *Philebus* distinctly states that the ἀπειρον is a mere concept including the most disparate things. The relations of the μὴ ὅν and the ἀπειρον are as distinctly stated in the *Sophist*, p. 256 ε, περὶ ἔκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἔστι τὸ ὅν ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὅν. Material objects and the concepts of untrained minds are said in the *Republic* to be no more ὄντα than μὴ ὄντα. But mere Cartesian matter or extension is explicitly called an ἀεὶ ὅν in the *Timaeus*, and it is quibbling to identify it with the logical μὴ ὅν. Lastly, it may be observed that "the author of the *Sophistes*" does not define ὄντως ὅν as δύναμις (p. 116). He says δύναμις is sufficient to constitute ὄντως ὄντα, and he does not employ this definition as the basis of his criticism of the ideas, but offers it by way of challenge to the materialists.

The pages devoted to Aristotle offer, of necessity, little more than a summary outline (mainly after Zeller) of the terminology and subject-matter of the Aristotelian treatises, from the Logic to the *Politics* and *Poetics*. It is permissible to rank Aristotle higher than Plato if one values the theory of the syllogism and the *Natural History* above the composition of works like the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. But it is not permissible to assert Aristotle's superiority as a philosophic and original thinker. The interpreter of Aristotle has, outside of the theory of the syllogism and the *Natural History*, just two tasks: first, to show how Aristotle reduced the dialectical and ethical suggestions he found in Plato into a systematic body of analytic doctrine where too often 'fehlt leider nur das geistige Band'; and, secondly, to point out in detail how, failing to work out consistently his rejection of the Platonic realism, Aristotle was driven back upon a theory which is exposed to every objection he has urged against the ideas. Aristotle's doctrine of an independent external world of *πρᾶται οὐσίαι* is, as Mill somewhere suggests, a form of realism. And the main interest which the student of speculative philosophy finds in the Aristotelian system consists in tracing the inevitable process by which the realistic assumptions latent in Aristotle's logic forced him, when he came to the problems of psychology and metaphysic, back upon the Platonic doctrine in a worse form. Our author shows some perception of this in his reference to the 'uebernommene Doppelbedeutung von εἶδος,' p. 151, his criticism of the shifting and elusive conceptions of matter and form, and of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, and his remarks on the dualism which ancient thought never overcame (p. 154). But he should have placed these things in the front of his argument, should have brought out more clearly the fundamental antithesis between

oνσία and the other categories taken as a whole, and should have subjected to a searching criticism Aristotle's 'letzte Objekt der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntniss' (p. 150), which he tells us is "weder das Einzelbild der Wahrnehmung, noch das Schema der Abstraktion sondern das Ding, welches in der Flucht seiner sinnlichen Erscheinungsformen sein begriffliches Wesen aufrechthält," and should have endeavored to make plain to us what sort of an 'undering' such a thing is. He would then have seen that the difference between Plato and Aristotle (p. 146) is not that Plato started from the concept, Aristotle from the judgment, but that Plato begins with the perceptible unit of consciousness, be it sensation or idea, Aristotle with the external reality known to the layman as a thing and to Mill as a real kind.

In matters of detail I note that the doubtful phrase $\tauὸ\ τί\ ἡν̄\ εἶναι\ . . .\ τὸ\ πρῶτον$, which occurs, I believe, only in the quibbling proof of the unity of the heavens, can hardly be taken absolutely, and without further explanation, as a synonym of the deity (p. 152). There is a similar application to the 'weltgott,' on page 38, of a Parmenidean phrase ($\tauὸ\ γὰρ\ πλέον\ ἔστι\ νόημα$) torn from its context, which would be likely to mislead a student. The distinction of *ὅμοιομερῆ* and *ἀνομοιομερῆ* (p. 150) was probably suggested to Aristotle by Protagoras 329 D and 333 A. 'Einheitliche konzentration' as a translation of *μεσότης* in De an. II 12 (p. 160) is, I think, an error of Zeller's. Plants are without sensation not because they have no 'einheitspunkt des seelenlebens' (Zeller), for this argument would prove too much and deprive some lower forms of animal life of sensation. The true reason is that plants are composed of the one element, earth, and the sense of touch requires an instrument like the flesh of animals, compounded of all elements, and capable, as an indifferent mean (*μεσότης*), of judging and comparing the extremes of the qualities of all. Hearing is the most precious sense only *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* as facilitating the representation of thought by conventional signs. Absolutely the preeminence belongs to sight, as in Plato. The explanation of the *κάθαρσις* of art (p. 169) as "nur dadurch möglich dass die Kunst . . . den Gegenstand in das Allgemeine erhebt" is not, I think, justified by Aristotle's words. He does not connect the two thoughts.

The survey of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy offers, perhaps, all that could be expected in so brief a compass. More space should have been given to Cicero. But I suppose it is idle to expect that scientific scholars will allow themselves to be influenced by what Teuffel naively calls the "accidental circumstance that an author's works are or are not extant."

PAUL SHOREY.